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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGILE. NORTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPARTl\ilENT OF EMPLOY- Case No. 
MENT SECURITY, AND BOARD 11292 
OF REVIE~r OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL CO.MMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises under the Utah Employment 
Security Act wherein the appellant seeks to recover 
unemployment compensation for a period of time when 
he was unemployed. Compensation was denied him by 
the respondents on the basis that he was a full time stu-
dent, pursuant to the provisions of 35-4-5 (g), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by the Session Laws 
of 1963. 
I 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY 
AD.l\iINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order hold. 
ing that the appellant was a full time student at the 
time of his discharge from his employment, and there. 
fore was not entitled to recover unemployment corn. 
pensation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Board of Re· 
view's decision in this matter, and an award to the appel· 
lant of compensation as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant had been employed full time as a 
painter for Trane Company from August 8, 1966, to 
January 19, 1968 (R-15). In this endeavor, he was 
earning approximately $440.00 per month, and had 
during the year 1967 earned a total income of $5,229.52 
(R-16). 
In addition to being employed by Trane Company 
as a painter, the appellant concurrently attended 'Vest· 
minster College at various times as a full time student, 
pursuing his college work in the mornings and continu· 
ing his full time occupation as a painter in the after· 
noons, he having worked the afternoon shift at Trane 
Company throughout the entire period of time that he 
was employed. 
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During the year 1966, Mr. Norton, the appellant, 
while still engaged as a full time painter, attended a fall 
semester at '"'" estminster College, which semester ran 
through the month of January, 1967 ( R-16) . At the 
termination of this semester, he was compelledto leave 
his educational endeavors because of reasons of health. 
He did, however, continue his occupation as a painter, 
and worked through the entire year until January of 
1968, when he was discharged for "reduction in force" 
by his employer (R-15). The appellant had returned 
to 'V estminster College in the fall semester of 1967, 
and carried a full course of instruction from September, 
1967, through January of 1968 ( R-17) . 
On the basis that Mr. Norton was a full time stu-
dent, the Department of Employment Security denied 
him unemployment compensation and this action was 
affirmed by the Board of Review (R-6, 23, 29). The 
appellant took all necessary steps to perfect his appeal 
to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Board 
of Review, and this matter is now properly before the 
Supreme Court for review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY AND THE BOARD OF REVIE"\V 
IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LA \V OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE FACTS OF 
TUE CASE. 
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One of the disputes between appellant and respond. 
ent is whether or not Section 35-4-5 (g), Utah Codt 
Annotated, 1953, as amended by the Session Laws ol 
1963, is applicable under the facts of the instant case. 
This section of Utah law states: 
"5. An individual shall be ineligible for bene. 
fits or for purposes of establishing a waitini 
period: 
(g) for any week in which he is registeren 
at and attending an established school, or ii 
on vacation during or between successive quar. 
ters or semeters of such school attendance 
unless the major portion of his wages for in· 
sured work during his base period was fOJ 
services performed while attending school, 
provided, however, that notwithstanding tht 
provisions of this subsection an otherwise eli· 
gible individual shall not be ineligible to re· 
ceive benefits while attending night school,~ 
part time training course, or a course approvea 
by the Commission ; and provided further that 
satisfactory attendance and satisfactory prog· 
gress in a course approved by the Commissior 
shall be evidence of availability." 
s 
n 
v 
There is no dispute of the fact that the appellant ha~ 
0 
been engaged as a full time painter at Trane Compan/ 
tc 
from September, 1966, through December 31, 1961. ti 
The fact that he did upon occasion attend W estminste1 
h 
College as a full time student does not in any war 
It 
detract from or change his status as a full time enl' 
, a Ul 
ployee under the "\Vorkmen s Compensation Act, an 
in particular under the unemployment provisions there 
4 
nd of. Had he not been attending 'Vestminster College 
odt during the Fall of 1967, this dispute would not have 
ol arisen, nor can the respondent say that he would not 
m have been entitled to unemployment benefits upon his 
involuntary termination in January of 1968, from his 
full time employment. 
ren 
'ii 
ar-
The fact that he was attending Westminster Col-
lege for the fall semester does not change his status 
as a full time employee. It is submitted that because he 
was in fact a full time employee, otherwise entitled to 
unemployment benefits, the mere entering of a school 
on a full time basis, while still maintaining his status 
as a full time employee, does not bring him within the 
purview of 35-4-5 (g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
ce. 
m 
fm 
101, 
tht 
~Ii· 
re· It is submitted that the purposes and intent of this 
section of the Utah law was to exclude from unemploy-
ment compensation privileges, students who merely 
1al worked part time or for several months a year while 
1g· 
or they pursued their normal course of education, normally 
working only during the summer months. It is easy to 
see that many abuses had arisen prior to the enactment 
of this act, or could have arisen where a student, going 
nr 
)1. to the college on a full time basis, would work during 
;el the summer months to earn enough money to go back 
ar to school, and because of his termination of his employ-
n· rnent after summer employment then be entitled to 
,a unemployment compensation. 
·e However, these are not the facts before the Court 
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today. The appellant in this case was in fact a bona 
fide full time employee who had earned in excess of 
$5,000.00 from his employment during the calendar 
year involved. The mere fact that he desired to return 
to college full time while still maintaining his full time 
employment does not in any way throw him into the 
category of a full time student. The fact that he saw 
fit to try to enhance his future earning capabilities by ' 
obtaining a college education by performing not only 
full time employment but likewise going to \Vest-
minster College on a full time basis does not change his 
basic status of a full time employee. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts i 
the appellant, even though he was attending a college r 
or school on a full time basis, was still a full time em· 
1 
ployee and not under the purview or the intent of Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as · 
amended. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Ken· 
necott Copper Employees, et al, v. Department of Em· 
ployment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P.2d 987, stated: 
"The Employment Security Act was designed 
to ease the burdens of unemployment and multi· 
various evils which ramify from it. I ts primary 
purpose is to assist the worker and his family 
in times when, without fault on his part, he is out 
of work. The secondary purpose is to provide 
stability for the general economy by assuring 
continuing of purchasing power." 
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a In light of the Supreme Court's announcement of the 
1f aims of the Employment Security Act, it is abundantly 
clear that the section of law relied upon in denying 
appellant his rights to unemployment security are not 
applicable. 
I' 
POINT II 
SECTION 35-4-5 (g), IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS IT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
Section 35-4-5 ( g) contains the following language: 
"(g) * * * That notwithstanding the provi-
sion~ of this subsection, an otherwise eligible in-
dividual shall not be ineligible to receive benefits 
while attending night school, a part time training 
course or a course approved by the Commission; 
* * *" 
It is submitted that the language of the Legi~lature 
in exempting night school but not day school where 
it does not conflict with a person's employment is dis-
criminatory and contrary to the Constitution of Utah 
and the Constitution of the United States. 
Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides that there shall be equal protection and bene-
fits afforded to the citizens of the State of Utah, and 
it is respectfully submitted that 35-4-5 (g) does not 
comply with equal protections to the citizens as it dis-
criminates against whether a person attends day school 
or night school, and has the effect of depriving one 
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who is attending day school from rights under the 
Unemployment Compensation Act, but affords cover-
age to those who attend night school although their 
situations may be identical, the facts of the case differ-
ing only as to the time of attendance and not to the 
extent or to any other factor. Likewise Section 35-4-5 
(g) offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
In the case of IJ-'I cGowan v. Mary land ( 1961 ) , 366 
US 420, 6 L.ed 2d 393, 81 S.Ct 1101, it was held: 
"Although no precise formula has been de-
veloped, the court has held that the Fourteenth 1 
Amendment provides the states a wide scope of . 
discretion in enacting laws which effect some • 
groups of citizens differently than others. The 
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the 
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant .. 
to the achievement of the state's objective. State · 
legislatures are presumed to have acted with their 
constitutional power despite the fact that in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu· 
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it." (Citing Cases) 
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in Rinaldi v. Yeager ( 1966), 384 US 305, 16 
L.ed 2d 577, 86 S.Ct 1497, stated: 
"The equal protection clause requires more. of ' 
the state law than nondiscriminatory application 
within the class it establishes. (Citing Cases) It 
also imposes a requirement of some rationalit~· 
in the nature of the class singled out. To be sure. 
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the constitutional demand is not a demand that a 
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. 
The constitution does not require things which 
are different in fact to be treated in law as though 
they were the same. (Citing Cases) Hence legis-
lation may impose special burdens upon defined 
classes in order to achieve permissable ends. But 
the equal protection clause does require that, in 
defining a class subject to legislation, the dis-
tinctions that are drawn have some revelance to 
the purposes for which the classification is made." 
(Citing Cases) 
It is submitted that in this day and age of manufactur-
ing companies and concerns commonly working two 
and three 1)hifts a day, it is immaterial whether or not 
a person is employed full time at night and desires 
to go to day school, or whether he is employed full time 
during the day and desires to go to night school. The 
legislative intent of the Act in question was to pro-
mulgate the welfare of the worker and of his family. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees, et al, v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P.2d 
987. 
There is no rational basis for singling out an em-
ployee who goes to night school from an employee who 
goes to day school. 
In the case of Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers 
(1959) 358 US 522, 3 L.ed 480, 79 S.Ct. 437, the 
Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"But there is a point beyond which the State 
cannot go without violating the equal protection 
9 
clause. The State must proceeed upon a rational 
basis and may not resort to a classification that 
is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been 
stated to be that clasification must rest upon some 
ground of difference having a fair and substan. 
tial relation to the object to the legislation.'" 
(Citing Cases) 
The constitutionality of 35-4-5 ( g) need not be 
determined if the court rules that the statute is inap. 
plicable as set forth in Point I above. Heathman v. 
Giles, 13 U. 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839. However, if the 
Court does not distinguish this case on its facts, it then 
must declare this section of the Utah Law unconsti-
tutional. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the Board of 
Review has misapplied the law to the facts, or in the 
alternative the law as applied is unconstitutional as it 
violates the equal protection guarantees of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. 
COTRO-.MANES, FANKHAUSER 
& BEASLEY 
By ............................................................... . 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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